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On April 2, 2007, the United States Supreme Court issued its
much-anticipated decision in Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency (E.P.A.).1  By a vote of 5-4, the Court decided
all of the issues presented in the case in favor of the states and
other parties that had challenged the decision of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) refusing to regulate green-
house gas emissions from motor vehicles.2  The Court held that:
the states and other petitioners met the constitutional require-
ments for pursuing their claims in federal court;3 the federal
Clean Air Act gives the EPA authority to regulate greenhouse
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  I was the primary au-
thor of petitioners’ briefs in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency , 127
S. Ct. 1438 (2007).  I am grateful to Sarah Nealen for research assistance on this
essay.
1 Massachusetts , 127 S. Ct. 1438.
2 Id.
3 Id. at 1454-55.
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gases;4 and the EPA could not refuse to exercise this authority by
citing policy considerations not enumerated in the statute5 or by
referring generally to the scientific uncertainty remaining with
respect to climate change.6  On each issue, the Court broke new
legal ground.  The implications of the Court’s decision for other
cases involving climate change are likely to be enormous.
I
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
In 1999, the International Center for Technology Assessment
and other parties petitioned the EPA to set standards for four
chemicals emitted by new motor vehicles: carbon dioxide, meth-
ane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons.7  The petition as-
serted that, due to effects on climate, motor vehicles emitting
those chemicals cause or contribute to “air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”
within the meaning of the Clean Air Act.8
In 2003, the EPA denied the petition.9  In explaining its deci-
sion, the agency announced, first, that the Clean Air Act “does
not authorize regulation to address global climate change,”10 and
that, therefore, air pollutants associated with climate change “are
not air pollutants under the [Act’s] regulatory provisions.”11  In
offering this interpretation of the term “air pollutant,” the EPA
relied on failed legislative proposals to address climate change;12
statutory provisions (in the Clean Air Act and elsewhere) ad-
dressing climate change in what the agency called a “nonregu-
latory” fashion;13 and an asserted tension between regulation of
air pollutants associated with climate change and the regulatory
structure of the Clean Air Act and Energy Policy and Conserva-
tion Act, which regulates vehicle fuel efficiency.14  Citing the “ec-
onomic and political significance” of the issue of climate change,
4 Id. at 1462.
5 Id. at 1463.
6 Id.
7 Id.  at 1449.
8 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
9 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003).
10 Id.  at 52,925.
11 Id. at 52,928.
12 Id.  at 52,924.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 52,925.
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the EPA stated that it was “urged on” in its legal judgment by the
Supreme Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp .,15 which had invalidated the Food and Drug Admin-
istration’s (FDA) regulation of tobacco products as “drugs”
under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.16
As a separate basis for its decision—discussed in a section enti-
tled “Different Policy Approach”—the EPA stated that it “dis-
agrees with the regulatory approach urged by petitioners,” and
that it would not be “effective or appropriate for EPA to estab-
lish [greenhouse gas] standards for motor vehicles at this time.”17
In place of the regulatory program created by section 202 of the
Clean Air Act, the EPA offered “near-term voluntary actions
and incentives” and “programs aimed at reducing scientific un-
certainties and encouraging technological development.”18
The EPA preferred a “different policy approach” for several
reasons.  First, noting that “[t]he science of climate change is ex-
traordinarily complex and still evolving,” the agency ran through
a list of scientific issues that remained inconclusively resolved.19
The EPA relied primarily on selective quotations from a 2001 re-
port by the National Research Council, disregarding, among
many others, that report’s important opening sentence: “Green-
house gases are accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as a result of
human activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface
ocean temperatures to rise.”20  Second, the EPA concluded that
regulation under section 202 was not warranted because it would
“result in an inefficient, piecemeal approach to addressing the
climate change issue,” since motor vehicles are one of many
sources of air pollutants associated with climate change.21  Third,
the EPA asserted that “[u]nilateral EPA regulation” on this mat-
ter could “weaken U.S. efforts to persuade key developing coun-
tries to reduce the [greenhouse gas] intensity of their
economies.”22  Regulation of air pollutants associated with cli-
15 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
16 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,928.
17 Id. at 52,929-30.
18 Id.  at 52,930.
19 Id.
20 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF
SOME KEY QUESTIONS 1 (2001).
21 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,931.
22 Id.
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mate change “raises important foreign policy issues,” the EPA
observed, which are “the President’s prerogative to address.”23
“In light of [these] considerations,” the EPA announced, the
agency “would decline the petitioners’ request to regulate motor
vehicle [greenhouse gas] emissions even if it had authority to
promulgate such regulations.”24
Petitioners sought review of the EPA’s decision in the D.C.
Circuit.  The appeals court panel split three different ways, with a
majority ruling in favor of the EPA.25  The Supreme Court
agreed to review the questions of whether the EPA had authority
to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act and
whether it could decline to exercise that authority based on pol-
icy considerations not enumerated in the statute.26  In their legal
brief opposing petitioners’ request that the Court review the
case, the United States and other parties made clear that they
also intended to argue that petitioners simply did not have the
right to challenge the EPA’s decision in federal court—or, in le-
gal jargon, they lacked “standing” to sue.27  I will review the
Court’s answers to each of these three questions, and their po-
tential implications, in turn.
II
EPA’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
GREENHOUSE GASES
A. The Court’s Decision
The question of the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse
gases under the Clean Air Act was the marquee issue in the case,
yet it was also the issue the Court appeared to find the most
straightforward.  The Court held that greenhouse gases are “air
pollutants” subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act.28  The
Court focused on the statutory text and proclaimed it “unambig-
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d ,
127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
26 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006); see also Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)
(No. 05-1120) (listing questions presented by the petitioner).
27 Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition at 6, Massachusetts , 127 S. Ct.
1438 (No. 05-1120).
28 Massachusetts , 127 S. Ct. at 1460.
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uous.”29  The Court held that legislation enacted after the rele-
vant provisions of the Clean Air Act did not impinge upon the
EPA’s pre-existing authority to regulate air pollutants and that
nothing in the Court’s decision in Brown & Williamson  justified
a narrow interpretation of the Act.30  The Court also held that
regulation under the Clean Air Act was not inconsistent with fuel
efficiency standards.31  More generally, the Court observed that
the Clean Air Act’s broad language defining air pollutants re-
flected “an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to
forestall . . . obsolescence” in the presence of “changing circum-
stances and scientific developments.”32
B. Implications
First, and most obviously, the Court’s ruling means that the
EPA may not decline to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles based on the argument that it has no authority to
do so.  The matter returns to the EPA for its decision whether
greenhouse gases may—in the language of the statute—“reason-
ably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”33  The
Clean Air Act does not set a deadline for the EPA’s decision.34
Pragmatically speaking, the Court’s decision puts some pressure
on the agency not to dilly-dally, but there is no fixed date by
which the EPA must act.
The Court’s decision on the EPA’s authority also has several
important legal consequences beyond this particular setting.
First, sources other than motor vehicles, such as power plants,
are governed by the same triggering language which applies to
motor vehicles.  Before the Court’s decision, the EPA had re-
fused to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from power plants on
the same ground on which it refused to regulate these emissions
from motor vehicles: that it had no authority to do so.35  That
decision was appealed, and the litigation stayed pending the out-
come of Massachusetts v. E.P.A.  Given the Court’s decision, the
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1461.
31 Id. at 1462.
32 Id. (citing Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998)).
33 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
34 See 42 U.S.C. § 7521.
35 Standards of Performance for Steam Generating Units, 71 Fed. Reg. 9866, 9869
(Feb. 27, 2006).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\22-2\OEL203.txt unknown Seq: 6 19-DEC-07 14:24
306 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 22, 301
EPA’s explanation for its refusal to regulate greenhouse gases
from power plants is not legally valid.
Another important consequence of the Court’s holding regard-
ing the EPA’s legal authority is that the Court’s previous decision
in Brown & Williamson  has now essentially been limited to its
facts.  The FDA’s effort to regulate tobacco under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act was invalidated, the Court explained in
Massachusetts v. E.P.A. , because the FDA had long disclaimed
any regulatory authority over tobacco and Congress had relied
on those disclaimers in enacting a whole series of tobacco-spe-
cific laws.36  Moreover, if the FDA had had authority to regulate
tobacco as a drug, it would have been required to ban it as un-
safe—something Congress clearly had not intended for the FDA
to do.37  Because the Court in Brown & Williamson  had also
cited the “economic and political” importance of tobacco in com-
ing to its decisions,38 many parties had seized upon the case in
arguing that regulation with large political or economic conse-
quences could not go forward without explicit direction from
Congress.39  That broad understanding of Brown & William-
son—which would spell doom for much regulation that might
otherwise have been required under Congress’ typically general
mandates—was rejected in Massachusetts v. E.P.A.40
In addition, given the Court’s holding on the EPA’s authority,
the automobile industry’s pending challenge to California’s own
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles is now
on much shakier legal ground.41  Before the Court’s decision, the
federal trial judge hearing the automobile industry’s challenge to
California’s regulation had stayed the California litigation, find-
ing that the two cases were so legally intertwined that it made
sense to hold off the California case until the Supreme Court
36 Massachusetts , 127 S. Ct. at 1461.
37 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 140 (2000).
38 Id.  at 133.
39 See Brief for Respondents Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Engine
Manufacturers Association, National Automobile Dealers Association, Truck Manu-
facturers Association at 41, Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438
(2007) (No. 05-1120); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of
the Environmental Protection Agency at 11-12, Massachusetts , 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No.
05-1120).
40 Massachusetts , 127 S. Ct. at 1461.
41 See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal.
2006).
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made its decision.42  One of the only claims left at that time was
industry’s claim that California’s regulation had been supplanted
by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.43  The Supreme
Court’s breezy, one-paragraph dismissal, in Massachusetts v.
E.P.A. , of a similar argument44 bodes ill for this aspect of the
automobile manufacturers’ lawsuit.  Indeed, a district judge in
Vermont recently rejected the auto manufacturers’ similar chal-
lenge to Vermont’s law adopting California’s greenhouse gas
standards for cars, partly on the strength of this aspect of Massa-
chusetts v. E.P.A.45
A final consequence of the Court’s ruling on the EPA’s author-
ity also relates to the litigation against California’s regulation.
The court in California has decided that California must obtain
permission—in the lingo, a “waiver”—from the EPA for its regu-
lation of greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles.46  Califor-
nia’s request for such a waiver has been pending at the EPA for
well over a year.47  Before the decision in Massachusetts v.
E.P.A. , there was considerable speculation that the EPA would
deny the waiver on the ground that if the EPA had no authority
to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, California
had none either.  That argument no longer has legal merit.  Other
reasons why the EPA could, under the law, deny a waiver—such
as a lack of “compelling and extraordinary conditions” in Cali-
fornia48—seem exceedingly ill-suited to regulations addressing
the compelling and extraordinary problem of climate change.
Although some argue that the Clean Air Act’s reference to com-
pelling and extraordinary conditions relates only to more tradi-
tional air pollution problems such as ground-level ozone,49
nothing in the language of the Act suggests this limitation.
Moreover, this argument reflects precisely the kind of climate-
42 Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, No. CV F 04-6663 AWI LJO,
2007 WL 135688, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2007).
43 Id. at *5.
44 Massachusetts , 127 S. Ct. at 1461-62.
45 See  Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, Nos. 2:05-
CV-302, 2:05-CV-304, 2007 WL 2669444 (D. Vt. Sept. 12, 2007).
46 Cent. Valley , 2007 WL 135688, at *6.
47 John M. Broder, California Wants Strict Auto Emission Rules , N.Y. TIMES, May
23, 2007, at A19.
48 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
49 See Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation , 93 VA. L.
REV. IN BRIEF 61, 67 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/
adler.pdf.
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A. The Court’s Decision
On the issue of agency discretion, the Court rejected argu-
ments that the EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gases was
unreviewable agency inaction.  While the Supreme Court had
previously held that an agency’s decision not to take enforcement
action against a particular party was presumptively unreview-
able,50 here it said that an agency’s refusal to issue a rule was
subject to judicial review for arbitrariness or legal error.51  Al-
though the Court initially described judicial review of an agency’s
refusal to issue a rule as “extremely limited” and “highly defer-
ential,”52 it went on to review the EPA’s refusal to regulate
greenhouse gases in a manner that was neither particularly lim-
ited nor particularly deferential.  The Court found that the EPA
erred by citing a “laundry list” of reasons why it preferred not to
regulate, rather than grounding its decision in the statutory crite-
rion of endangerment of public health and welfare.53  In answer-
ing a petition for rulemaking, the Court said the agency’s
“reasons for action or inaction must conform to the authorizing
statute.”54  Even if the agency found the science of climate
change uncertain, the Court stated that the agency could not re-
fuse to regulate greenhouse gases unless the science was so pro-
foundly uncertain that the agency could not even form a
judgment as to whether greenhouse gases were endangering pub-
lic health or welfare.55  “The statutory question,” the Court said,
“is whether sufficient information exists to make an endanger-
ment finding.”56
50 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
51 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459 (2007).
52 Id.  (citing Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of America, Inc. v.
United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
53 Id. at 1462-63.
54 Id.  at 1462.
55 Id. at 1463.
56 Id.
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B. Implications
The Court’s decision considerably narrows the EPA’s options
in deciding whether to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles.  Given the scientific evidence on climate change
and the agency’s own public statements acknowledging the
threats posed by climate change,57 it is almost unthinkable that
the agency could say that the science of climate change is too
uncertain even to make a finding whether public health or wel-
fare are endangered by greenhouse gases.  For the same reasons,
it is hard to believe that the agency could conclude that green-
house gases may not reasonably be anticipated to endanger pub-
lic health or welfare.  The statutory standard is reasonable
anticipation, not absolute certainty.58  Furthermore, agencies’ de-
cisions must conform to the evidence before them and they must
explain their decisions in light of that evidence.59  These legal re-
quirements, and the existing scientific record on climate change,
make it exceedingly unlikely that the EPA could lawfully find
that greenhouse gases do not pass the threshold of
endangerment.
A finding of endangerment is the triggering event for much
regulation under the Clean Air Act.60  Thus the Court’s decision
trims the EPA’s discretion to refuse to regulate under other parts
of the Act as well.  Beyond the Clean Air Act, the Court’s deci-
sion recognizes that agencies have as much obligation to refrain
from unlawfully failing  to regulate as they do to refrain from un-
lawfully regulating.61  Although legal scholars since the New
Deal have recognized that as much harm can come from an inert
government as from an active government, courts often have not
seen it that way.62 Massachusetts v. E.P.A.  plants a flag on the
side of those who think government can err (and injure) in not
doing enough.
57 See generally U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Climate Change, http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/index.html (2007) (offering comprehensive information on climate
change impacts, science, and policy).
58 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
59 See, e.g. , Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1983).
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
61 See Massachusetts , 127 S. Ct. at 1459.
62 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 851 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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IV
STANDING TO SUE
A. The Court’s Decision
Parties seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts
must meet three requirements: they must have what the Court
deems an injury in fact, which may not be speculative or conjec-
tural; that injury must be causally linked to the legal violation
they are asserting; and the judicial relief they seek must redress
their injury.63  Focusing on Massachusetts’ involvement in the
case, the Court prefaced its entire discussion of standing by em-
phasizing that “the party seeking review here is a sovereign
State” and that it was “entitled to special solicitude in our stand-
ing analysis.”64  The Court then found that Massachusetts already
had experienced injury from rising sea levels and that “the sever-
ity of that injury will only increase over the course of the next
century.”65  On causation, the Court concluded that, “[j]udged by
any standard, U.S. motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful
contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, ac-
cording to petitioners, to global warming.”66  Last, the Court
found redressability because the risk of “catastrophic harm”
from climate change would be reduced “to some extent” by the
relief petitioners sought.67
B. Implications
After this decision, it is improbable that any state will be de-
nied standing to bring a claim related to climate change.  All
states are suffering current effects from climate change, although
some more than others.  It is possible, of course, that a state
could fail to describe its injury from climate change with suffi-
cient specificity or accuracy; but this would be a lawyer’s mistake,
not a legal barrier to suing.  It is also possible that some claims
will involve pollution sources that contribute a smaller portion of
greenhouse gases to the atmosphere than United States motor
vehicles do.  It may become necessary, at some point, to further
define the meaning of the Court’s generous “to some extent”
63 Massachusetts , 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
64 Id. at 1454, 1455.
65 Id. at 1456.
66 Id.  at 1457-58.
67 Id.  at 1458.
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test.68  But there is no doubt that the Court’s ruling opens the
courthouse door wide to states pursuing legal claims related to
climate change.
It is a closer question whether private litigants will be able to
take advantage of the Court’s broad ruling on standing.  The
Court’s prefatory remarks on the special status of state claims
suggest that private litigants might find it harder than states to
meet the requirements for standing.69  Yet the Court also thought
it “clear that petitioners’ submissions as they pertain to Massa-
chusetts have satisfied the most demanding standards of the ad-
versarial process”70—signaling, perhaps, that petitioners would
have standing even without being shown any “special solicitude.”
Moreover, the Court’s analysis of each of those requirements in
this case had, ultimately, nothing to do with the presence of
states in the case; it was, instead, a perfectly conventional render-
ing of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.  As often hap-
pens in law, the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. E.P.A.
answered several questions while raising several others.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1454-55.
70 Id. at 1455 (emphasis added).
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